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Mutual misunderstanding between decision-makers in the political and
technical environment leads to programs that experience cost overruns,
schedule delays and, often, cancellation. This paper compares and
contrasts the determinants of decision-making in the technical and
political realms, with the intention of demonstrating how these decisions
translate to cost, schedule and performance parameters. Studies of those
elements that are most salient to the policy maker are informed by the
political science literature. In particular, studies of administrative,
bureaucratic and Congressional decision-making are instructive in
determining how an engineering system interacts with the political realm.
So as to lend concreteness to this analysis, we focus on NASA’s
interactions with Congress surrounding the Vision for Space Exploration,
announced by President Bush on January 14th, 2004.
Roots and Branches
Perhaps the primary difference between an engineering decision and a political
decision is the method by which conclusions are achieved. Whereas traditional
engineering strives for rationality and optimal trades between clear objectives,
political decisions are largely marked by compromise aimed at building
supporting coalitions. Furthermore, the complexities of the political environment
impose considerable limitations on rational choice. (Lindblom 1959) discusses
these limitations in detail by identifying two paradigms for approaching a
problem. The first, which he calls the “Rational-Comprehensive” or “root”
method, is a description of a rational/positivist approach in which a decision
maker will begin by clarifying values or objectives and then formulate
comprehensive policy through means-end analysis. This method, representing the
archetype of ideal engineering design, requires evaluating every alternative in a
particular decision space and, although it is theoretically mathematically tractable,
it requires a clear definition of goals and, perhaps more importantly, a well-
defined utility function that can be used to distinguish between outcomes. When
executed properly, a rational design yields a result that maximizes some
performance metric within the basis of well-understood scientific theory. Thus,
reliance on theory is the cornerstone of the root method.
Lindblom argues that genuine execution of the Rational-Comprehensive method
for all but the simplest problems lies beyond the memory capacity of any human
being. Engineers, generally possessing design goals, can circumvent these
2limitations using tools designed to identify an optimal design upon the basis of
generalizable theory.  The complexity of the political environment, on the other
hand, is currently beyond the reach and understanding of any encompassing
predictive theory. Furthermore, the existence of multiple independent intelligent
actors suggests that any high-fidelity prediction is naturally intractable. In order to
describe decision-making in this regime, Lindblom defines the method of
“Successive Limited Comparisons”, or the “branch” method, which argues that
the decision making process is one in which identification of values and goals are
not separate from empirical analysis. Similarly, means and ends are not distinct,
implying that a goal is generally not well-defined. Furthermore, since means-ends
analysis is limited to those few alternatives that the decision maker can
simultaneously consider, possible outcomes, policies and values are often not
considered at all. Lindblom claims that, in the vast majority of cases, a decision
maker will rely upon the branch method due to the fact that the computational
power and data that are required to achieve the root method are generally not
available. This represents the standard archetype of political decision-making.
Resulting policies are therefore likely to be suboptimal from a purely rationalist
standpoint. Where engineering design is aimed at maximizing lifecycle
performance, politics aims to maximize immediate desirability so that an item
may be cleared from the policy-maker’s agenda.
The method of Successive Limited Comparisons highlights the importance of a
providing a diversity of viewpoints to decision makers since they will only be able
to choose between the arguments that are directly available and salient to them.
This provides an implicit justification for a group to undertake advocacy activities
since, without them, decision makers will naturally tend to forget about or ignore
the viewpoints and goals that that particular group represents. Perhaps more
importantly, it indicates that an actor who controls the flow of information
concurrent with technical expertise possesses some degree of control over the
final decision that is made. It is exactly this type of control that any administrative
agency with technical expertise, can exercise in its interactions with Congress.
Salience and Attention
The stage is set for a description of the policy-making process as a battle between
interest groups for salience within decision makers’ limited attention resources. In
the face of numerous pressing concerns from all sides, a policy maker will by
necessity choose those alternatives that are directly within reach and most likely
to simultaneously satisfy the largest number of stakeholders in the short-term.
This suggests an environment of pure competition between interest groups
wherein each group attempts to dominate the attention of the decision maker.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the branch method also allows for agreement
on policies without a necessary agreement on the goals that those policies might
imply. Therefore, cooperation and coalition-building between groups that might
3both stand to gain from a particular policy occurs, even though these groups
might have completely different viewpoints and opposing goals. A savvy
politician builds consensus one step at a time, helping various groups achieve
intermediate goals, to the extent that those goals are congruent with his/her
ultimate goal.
The ability to agree on means when ends are in stark contrast is foreign to the
traditional engineering mentality, which typically identifies a set of design goals
and trades design parameters against this goal until exogenously-imposed
requirements are fulfilled. Since political decision-makers often set, or must at
least approve, the high-level goals of a publicly-funded endeavor, the above
argument provides an explanation for why publicly-funded systems are subject to
changing policy priorities. This, in turn, calls for an examination of how political
goal-setting takes place.
Goals and Values
(Van Dyke 1962) follows Lindblom’s lead in suggesting that values may be
defined as either “goal values”, which are necessary in and of themselves and
“instrumental values” that are necessary to the performance of another goal. He
explains that a “goal value” is defined by the particular organization or individual
in question, and that one organization’s goal value might be another’s
instrumental value. This is particularly true for engineering systems, where the
design goal of the system is likely to deliver instrumental value rather than directly
serving a policy-maker’s goal values. A case in point of this dynamic is the goal
value of space exploration championed by NASA. Depending on the desires of
the President and Congress of the time, this goal value was generally instrumental
towards accomplishing some other goal. For example, the Apollo program was
instrumental to defeating the Russians in a Cold War space race; the Shuttle
program was instrumental as a high-tech re-election campaign; the International
Space Station was instrumental first to demonstrate to the Soviet Union the
resolve of the free world, and later, to employ Russian scientists who might
otherwise contribute to nuclear proliferation. Thus, NASA’s relevance to a
political decision-maker increases or decreases to the extent that space
exploration is instrumental to the goal values of the Presidency and Congress.
Stakeholders’ goal values may be ranked using the Hierarchy of Needs proposed in
(Maslow 1970).
4Figure 1: Maslow's "hierarchy of needs". An
individual’s attention is immediately diverted
towards its most basic need when that need is
endangered. Image sourced from (Maslow).
Thus, an instrumental goal is more likely to get support when it is linked to a goal
value that is low on the pyramid, such as “security” or “safety”. This has
implications for coalition building because an interest group might be willing to
support a given policy even though that policy might not be directly related to
that group’s “goal value”. If a case can be made that the policy, as executed,
would serve as an instrumental goal for that interest group, then that interest
group may provide support. Similarly, if a seemingly irrevocable conflict should
arise between interest groups, a solution might be found by redirecting attention
away from the value goals in conflict toward those instrumental goals that are
held in common. To paraphrase Charles Dudley Warner, politics does indeed
make strange bedfellows.
Van Dyke’s work has important implications for the designer, suggesting that
technical expertise in administration is relied upon to promote politically selected
values, an argument also suggested in (Jasanoff 1987). In the case of NASA, this
suggests that any exploration architecture must actively seek relevance to current
national policy. This further suggests that activities that are not directly relevant
5will not receive attention and will, at best, be left “idling” with incremental
funding and, at worst, be cut. At the same time, NASA has a unique role as the
technical experts in all things related to their mandate in civil aerospace. As such,
they are in a unique role to control the flow of information. Thus, once a
congressional directive is issued, NASA has enormous power in determining the
implementation for how that directive will be fulfilled and in what options are
under consideration. Whereas Maslow’s hierarchy suggests that salience may be
achieved by putting a given value under threat, Van Dyke suggests that salience
may be achieved through direct relevance to existing national priorities. This
further suggests that the designer should explicitly consider the goal values that
the system to be designed is intended to achieve. This is complicated by the fact
that there are often many goal values – at least one for each stakeholder group –
and that they may be in conflict. In this case, Van Dyke suggests that the best
course of action is to alert the stakeholders of the potential conflicts and of the
tradeoffs that will have to be made. This gives the stakeholders a sense of
responsibility and ownership in the process, and allows for ease of negotiation. In
the words of Otto von Bismarck, “politics is the art of the possible”. It is
therefore the role of the technical expert to outline the space of possible options.
At the same time, efforts must be undertaken by supporters of a given system
design to illustrate to political decision-makers the consequences of changing
resource allocations.
It is worth noting that linkage to a high-salience agenda item, such as a particular
national security concern, is a double-edged sword. Whereas such a linkage is
likely to ensure the program significant support in the short-term, eventual
solution of the high-salience problem is likely to lead to the determination that so
much support is no longer necessary. On the other hand, linkage to an item that
is of lower salience, such as an ongoing mission of scientific discovery, is likely to
receive less funding on an annual basis but is also likely to be more robust to large
swings in support.
The above analysis illustrates some motivations behind the swiftly-changing
nature of the political process. The political system is sufficiently complex that it
likely lies beyond any current predictive capacity. Nonetheless, it is possible to
outline certain patterns of behavior that seem to occur with regularity. (Simon
1964) notes that although individual members of an organization might be very
different people, they must fulfill their organizational “roles”. For example, an
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) examiner will seek to reduce costs and
increase efficiency regardless of the person holding that role. The role therefore
defines, to some extent, the actions of the individuals holding that role. Although
personal goals do play a part in organizations, Simon notes that actions on the
basis of personal goals will be small compared to actions on the basis of role
goals because of training and self-selection. One can therefore infer an
6organization’s goal simply from its behavior, since any action not taken is
prevented by a constraint. As such, we may draw general conclusions about the
behavior of specific types of political actors. Indeed, agencies often rely on this
quasi-predictable type of behavior when generating budgetary strategy.
(Kingdon 2003) outlines the roles of several major players within the U.S.
government. This book is a valuable source for any student of policy, providing
quantitative and anecdotal evidence to support descriptions of policy actors and
the types of power that they wield. A model of how policies are generated is then
created, based upon the ethos of (Cohen, March et al. 1972), which essentially
describes organizational choice as occurring in an almost unpredictable semi-
chaotic fashion, driven by a complicated interplay of multiple streams. In
particular, Kingdon characterizes three “streams” of policy-making – the Political
Stream, the Policy Stream, and the Problems Stream. The Political Stream,
composed of “such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election
results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of
administration”, characterizes that element of the policy-making process that is
colloquially identified as “politics”. The author explains the events of the Political
Stream in some detail, describing it as a promoter of agenda items. The Policy
Stream, on the other hand, is largely dominated by specialists in a certain field,
such as agency civil servants. Solutions are generated, often without specific
problems to which these solutions might be attached, generating the
phenomenon of “solutions looking for problems”. The primary role of the
members of the Policy Stream is to narrow the set of all possible policy proposals
into a short list of those that are both technically feasible and may be seriously
considered. Kingdon further classifies policy communities within this stream as
either fragmented or non-fragmented, noting that fragmented communities, those
that are composed of many diverse interests, are generally less successful because
of their lack of coordination. This point is supported by the work of (Olson
1984). Kingdon draws parallels between the fragmentation of a policy community
and the fragmentation of the associated political system, arguing that more
fragmented systems require more overhead coordination. Finally, there is the
Problems Stream, in which specific issues become taken up by the public and are
brought to the attention of the electorate. This stream is largely influenced by
leading indicators that policy makers can use to measure the efficacy of a
problem’s solution. Problems that are not initially salient are brought to policy
makers’ attentions through “focusing events”, such as crises, accidents or
symbolic actions. Kingdon describes the coming together of these three streams
as the creation of a “policy window” through which a successful policy
entrepreneur can achieve a lasting action. For a specific issue, these windows are
generally short-lived and must be acted upon promptly when discovered, thus
necessitating that a successful policy entrepreneur be constantly prepared to take
advantage of changing circumstances. For a given technical design, this suggests
7that policy advocates will attempt to justify the system as a potential solution to
an existing problem for which the system might previously have had no
requirement.
Budgetary Politics
(Wildavsky 1964) is a detailed studied of agency-Congress interactions and the
attempts that agencies might use in order to assure and/or increase their yearly
budget. Casting budget requests as well-thought-out strategies made by each
agency, a budget request is generally aimed at getting the agency the maximum
amount of money requested, but not so much that the request loses credibility.
Arguing that “If politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences
shall prevail in the determination of national policy, then the budget records the
outcome of this struggle”, Wildavsky characterizes executive branch agencies as
organizational actors whose primary goal is to maximize their budget on a yearly
basis. In his analysis, he identifies numerous strategies used by each agency in this
endeavor, devoting an entire chapter to their description. Many of Wildavsky’s
strategies are insightful and the savvy system architect may make use of them to
incorporate design rules that can aid the political supporters of the program.
Budgetary Incrementalism
Wildavsky argues that limited Congressional attention and budgetary resources,
combined with each agency’s simultaneous attempt to defend or increase its
budget will result in “incrementalism”, a state wherein each year, a budget may
only increase or decrease slightly relative to the previous year’s baseline. This has
significant implications for technical design in that one can not expect any sharp
spikes in funding, even though such increases might be necessary to see a
program transition from its development phase to its operations phase; rather the
agency’s budgetary profile must be relatively constant over time. This suggests
that as one project starts to consume more resources, the necessary funding will
have to come from other projects. This funding will invariably come from those
projects that do not have strong supporters defending them. This is particularly
problematic within an agency like NASA where operations costs have
traditionally been high, stifling new development. Indeed, it is more likely that a
political actor will defend a program that is already operating than one that is still
in its conceptual or development phase, and therefore delivering no concrete
results to a constituent base. Most importantly, Wildavsky’s empirically-derived
observation links political events to budgetary salience, suggesting that without a
clear goal established by political mandate, no incremental agency can expect
significant funding changes. On the one hand, this suggests that large
development programs that do not fit within the current budget are unlikely to be
funded. On the other hand, this observation reveals a sort of safety net,
essentially guaranteeing that, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the
8agency is unlikely to lose its current funding level for the foreseeable future. As
such, an agency’s survival is a sort of existence proof that it provides a valuable
contribution to society. It is only when an agency tries to increase its budget that
it must justify its added value against that of its competitors.
(Davis, Dempster et al. 1966; Davis, Dempster et al. 1974) build off of
Wildavsky’s work by creating a mathematical description of budgetary agency
allocations for each year, noting that Congress tends to follow an incremental
strategy in allocating funding to agencies. In effect, they note that, in the absence
of what they term “political shocks”, agencies will receive approximately what
they received in the previous year plus some fraction of what they requested. The
motivation for this description is that Congress, lacking the attention resources to
re-construct the budget from the ground up every year, must instead look at the
previous budget for its guidelines and base the new budget on this data.
Budgetary data from many agencies confirms the incremental hypothesis for
some length of time, although incremental periods are often separated by short
(one- or two-year-long) periods of non-incremental behavior. These sources
provide no means of predicting these shocks, rendering their theory descriptive
rather than predictive. Nonetheless, it is instructive to observe that, since the end
of the Apollo program, NASA’s budget and activities have become increasingly
characterized as incremental in recent years, particularly as Congressional
influence over NASA’s budgetary process became stronger. (Jahnige 1968),
written near the end of the Apollo program, describes this process in detail,
observing that NASA, which had previously been impervious to Congressional
oversight due to its strong presidential support and highly technical nature was
now subject to an increasingly aware Congress that began to exert more control
in curtailing NASA’s spending activities largely through the employ of technically-
capable staffers.
The Politics of Space Exploration
The effects of Congressional attention on American space policy is recounted in
detail in (Johnson-Freese 2003). Noting that several members of Congress see
NASA as “an entitlement or jobs program for its employees and contractors”, the
author concludes that costs tend to grow significantly when spent for political
rather than technical purposes. This perception is strengthened by the fact that
the scientific and technical nature of space activities is often viewed as arcane and
beyond the grasp of the average Congress member. This, in turn, motivates a
focus on other, more directly salient concerns, such as geographic distribution of
jobs. Regardless of the Congress member’s personal beliefs, each member is
motivated to remain in his or her elected position, thus requiring that benefits be
provided to constituents. (Roust 2002) elaborates on this hypothesis,
demonstrating the role-based power of specific committee members on NASA
allocations. Thus, in order to be politically relevant, NASA must ensure that its
9money is spent in line with the political powers-that-be. As a multi-member
legislature, Congress is often home to many differing and sometimes changing,
opinions. In the absence of strong and sustained Presidential leadership, these
opinions will come to dominate NASA’s agenda, often resulting in changing
requirements and redesigns, as NASA tries to adapt to serve all constituencies.
Nonetheless, individual Congress-members need to maintain a reputation for
responsibility, both to their constituents and to the nation. This means that, in the
face of cost- and schedule- overruns, Congress members will demand
accountability even if the lag in performance metrics is in part created by
Congressional politics. Noting that “…incrementalism occurs when the decision-
maker lacks the information and knowledge to put forward space policy goals”,
Johnson-Freese ties Congressional action to the work of Wildavsky, suggesting
that incrementalism is a specific strategy employed by a non-technical Congress
to ensure oversight of, and some measure of control over, NASA’s programs.
(Logsdon 1986; McCurdy 1990) both elaborate on the extent to which NASA has
adopted an incremental, coalition-based strategy in its dealings with an
increasingly powerful Congress. Specifically, they address the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station,
both of which resulted in designs that are suboptimal from a purely technical
standpoint but are nonetheless strong sources of Congressional benefits.
Nevertheless, a question remains as to their efficacy in accomplishing the goals of
Presidential politics. (Johnson-Freese 2003) observes that “[a]s long as the status
quo is maintained, Congress seems content to remain mostly a benign
benefactor…[t]he result is that Congress is not generally able to force coherent
long-term change, nor does it really want to. Instead, legislative solutions tend to
be across the board budget percentage cuts or caps to which agencies adapt to as
best as possible. This often means continual downsizing of programs, but not a
pruning out or elimination of anyone’s particular program. It also explains why
NASA’s programs, such as ISS today, are often over budget and behind
schedule”. Many of NASA’s cost and schedule problems are exacerbated, if not
caused, by the political environment in which it sits. For example, the Columbia
Accident Investigation Report (CAIB) remarked upon a “…lack, over the past
three decades, of any national mandate providing NASA a compelling mission
requiring human presence in space…The result is the agency has found it neces-
sary to gain the support of diverse constituencies. NASA has had to participate in
the give and take of the normal political process in order to obtain the resources
needed to carry out its programs. NASA has usually failed to receive budgetary
support consistent with its ambitions. The result…is an organization straining to
do too much with too little.” (Gehman, Barry et al. 2003) The above analysis
suggests that the CAIB’s conclusions regarding the political environment in
which NASA exists represent the norm rather than the deviation. We may
therefore expect such behavior to continue for some time to come.
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Incrementalism in the Vision for Space Exploration
The Vision for Space Exploration, presumably anticipating Congressional
incrementalism, advances a relatively constant NASA budget proposal for the
long-term, increasing only to adjust for expected inflation rates after FY09 (see
Figure 2). Unlike the days of the Apollo program, when schedule, rather than
cost, was the primary mission driver, one may expect NASA’s budget to remain
largely constrained within this funding envelope. Furthermore, it is not
inconceivable that funding might decrease in the face of shifting priorities.
Figure 2. The following “sandchart”, representing
NASA’s expected budget through time, shows a
slight increase in NASA funding, after which the
budget increases linearly in real dollars, in effect
remaining constant with inflation. Source: (NASA
2004)
The linear budget predicted after FY07 is consistent with the incremental model
of budgeting, which asserts that, for an agency, “models of the of the budgetary
process are linear, stochastic, and strategic in character” (Davis, Dempster et al.
1966). An agency-level examination of recent NASA budgetary appropriations
does indeed yield a roughly linear time-series, as shown in Figure 3. The
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stochastic nature of these appropriations characterizes the slight deviations from
the linear approximation. Furthermore, NASA has previously been characterized
as an incremental organization following the end of the Apollo era (McCurdy
1990).
NASA Budget, 1998-2004
y = 0.328x + 13.036
R2 = 0.9043
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
N
A
S
A
 B
u
d
g
et
, i
n
 B
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
R
ea
l D
o
lla
rs Actual NASA Budget
Linear Fit of Budget
Data
Figure 3. The above chart portrays NASA’s total
budget as granted by Congress, in real dollars. Note
that it increases roughly linearly through time. A
true incremental model would also incorporate data
pertaining to the agency’s budget request, perhaps
providing a stronger correlation (NASA 2006).
Note that Figure 2 predicts very gradual growth through time for most of
NASA’s programs, with the exception that, as programs retire, their funds are
folded into the Crew Exploration Vehicle and Exploration Missions. In general,
this sandchart is devoid of sharp increases or decreases in funding on a yearly
basis, that might belie the presence of conflict or changing priorities within the
budgetary process. Nevertheless, incrementalism cannot be generalized to the
programmatic level (Natchez and Bupp 1973).
Figure 4 shows the same data as in Figure 3, except that here, budget is broken
down by program, rather than aggregated at the agency level.
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Figure 4: The above chart displays the same
budgetary data as in Figure 3, broken down by
program. The data are characterized by sharp,
nonlinear changes associated with reorganizations
(in FY2000) and shifting priorities (between
FY2002 and FY2003) (NASA 2006).
Each program component historically underwent periods of non-incremental
behavior. Comparing 2002 to 2003, for example, one notes a one-billion dollar
shift from “Science, Aeronautics and Technology” toward “Human Space
Flight”. In 2004, much of this funding is restored. In addition, the year 2000 saw
the folding of “Mission Support” into the other two budgetary categories. This
suggests that there are political forces at work beyond the traditional budgetary
“satisficing” (Lindblom 1959). Indeed, previous work has faulted the incremental
model for its inability to capture such program-level dynamics. An incremental
analysis is therefore insufficient to characterize the program-level budgetary
environment through time. Since engineering systems are generally designed
within the context of a program, rather than within the context of an entire
agency, we must focus on determining the causes of these program-level
dynamics.
Program-Level Politics
(Natchez and Bupp 1973) critiques the incremental model of budgeting; arguing
that although the outcome of the budgetary process may indeed be incremental,
the politics and the struggles leading to such an outcome are far from
deterministic. Their examinations of the Atomic Energy Commission’s budget
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reveal that, although the agency budget possessed a relatively linear incremental
profile over time, individual programs were subject to wild swings in budgetary
favor that correlated with executive branch policies. Figure 4 shows a similar
outcome; whereas the overall agency profile is relatively constant, the
disaggregated budgets are subject to changes of up to $1 billion per year, an
appreciable amount compared to the agency’s overall budget of about $15 billion.
This suggests that although an agency’s budget is likely to be stable over time, a
specific program is much more subject to unpredictable political perturbations.
This is especially true if such a program is “invisible” to Congress because it lacks
the backing of a powerful constituency. Without congressional support, such a
program is much more likely to be used as a political bargaining chip within the
Executive Branch, potentially endangering its future survival. This is particularly
true if the program has neither Congressional nor Presidential salience. Lacking a
powerful constituency to support it, the program is likely to be cut so as to free
funding for other priorities. This, in turn, raises the question of how a program
might achieve Congressional or Presidential salience, thus guaranteeing at least
some measure of stability of funding.
Congress-Agency Interactions
(Cohen and Noll 1991) analyzes this problem as it relates to R&D projects within
the context of the American federal system, drawing some general conclusions
regarding the comparative roles of Congress and the President. Their conclusions
are somewhat bleak, noting that “American political institutions introduce
predictable, systematic biases into R&D programs so that, on balance,
government programs will be susceptible to performance underruns and cost
overruns”. Nonetheless, the authors make important comments regarding how a
program might achieve electoral salience, outlining three general types of
circumstances. The first of these occurs when an R&D project is directly related
to the state of the nation. Examples include the space race with the Soviet Union
culminating in the Apollo program, the energy crisis of the 1970s leading to a
brief increase in funding for alternative energy sources, and the Strategic Defense
Initiative (Star Wars) missile defense system proposed during the Reagan
administration. A second instance in which R&D programs become salient is the
fallout resulting from a disaster or some event that exposes mismanagement or
corruption within the program. Finally, the authors cite distributive effects;
specifically the money and jobs created within the districts of individual members
of Congress, and campaign contributions required for re-election. This particular
circumstance becomes especially important when many individual constituents
have a stake in the continuation of a program. The authors link political salience
to contract size noting that positive spillover effects from increased employment
increase salience for political representatives, eventually reaching beyond
congressional districts and potentially into the attention of senators and possibly
even presidential candidates. Nonetheless, as a program size continues to grow, it
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will eventually reach a point of diminishing political returns. A notional diagram
of this concept is show in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Notional representation of the effects of
contract size on political salience
It is worth noting that a program that promises electoral advantages for the
future is much less likely to receive support than a program that is currently
delivering value. This is largely due to the uncertainty surrounding who will
receive development contracts. Cohen and Noll note that “citizens who are
unaware that they are destined to be employed in the new program are unlikely to
engage in political behavior motivated by its enactment. Once contracts are
awarded and workers are hired…identifiable and organized groups (firms, unions,
local governments) have a clear stake.” This sort of behavior, in which potential
losses loom larger than potential gains, is well-documented in the risk-aversion
and psychology literature, and is especially consistent with the predictions of
“Prospect Theory” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Furthermore, we may expect
Congressional representatives to share this type of behavior with regards to
distributive benefits within their district, largely because their prospects for re-
election depend on the continued support of their constituencies. Thus, a
program is likely to engender salience from Congress members if the distributive
benefits that it provides are simultaneously put under threat and sufficiently large
to warrant the attention. (Cohen and Noll 1991) further elaborate on this theme,
characterizing politicians, and Congress-members in particular, as impatient and
risk-averse with regards to R&D programs. Since R&D programs are naturally
risky prospects with uncertain results and payoffs in the long-term, they tend to
Contract Size ($)
Political Salience
Representative’s Salience:
District-level
Senator’s Salience:
 State-level
President’s Salience:
 National-level
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be systematically undervalued within the American political system. This suggests
that programs which can deliver politically-relevant benefits early on are more
likely to be sustained by Congress. The President, on the other hand, has more
latitude to propose large long-term programs. Cohen and Noll note that “A
president must certainly be concerned that programs initiated in one term will not
be carried to conclusion in the next; however, if a program is reasonably
successful, and if expenditures are large enough to cross the threshold of political
significance for a number of legislators, a president can be reasonably confident
that a program will be difficult to kill in subsequent sessions of the legislature.”
This argument casts the President in the role of proposing programs while
leaving it to the Congress to sustain these programs, a statement supported by the
game-theoretic analysis of (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). If, on the other hand,
the President were to try to sustain a program unpopular with Congress, the
program would likely not be successful. Therefore, the distributive goals of
Congress members must be taken into account, even, and perhaps especially,
with Congressional support.
The role of the agency is to ensure that the execution of a program’s agenda is
both politically acceptable and technically feasible. This is often accomplished
through agency-industry coalitions wherein much of the agency funding is
allocated to industry contractors, many of whose firms represent large political
constituencies. This phenomenon, often referred to as a “revolving door” or an
“iron triangle”, can increase political support within Congress but has the
potential to stifle
innovation.
Figure 6: The "revolving door" or "iron triangle" --
a self-reinforcing feedback mechanism among
…Government
Agencies that let
contracts to…
…Industrial Coalitions
that are located in the
electoral districts of…
…Members of
Congress that provide
funding to…
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members of Congress, Industrial Coalitions and
Executive Branch Agencies (Cohen and Noll
1991).
Given the challenges inherent in generating a program that will gain and maintain
Presidential and Congressional salience, (Cohen and Noll 1991) discusses many
of these issues in significant detail, outlining a set of general characteristics that an
R&D program might posses in order to make it more likely to survive in the
political environment. These characteristics are as follows:
“First, the government is more likely to be willing to undertake programs
oriented toward a concentrated industry than a competitive one.” (Cohen and
Noll 1991)
This particular characteristic speaks to the relative political ease of associating
with a small, concentrated number of players rather than a larger, more diffuse
interest (Olson 1984). For the purposes of determining the available budget for a
new development program, this characteristic speaks to the Congressional desire
to avoid alienating a key constituency. Thus, the concerns of those groups that
are heavily invested in aerospace must be taken into consideration. For example,
this characteristic suggests an advantage to using legacy components for NASA’s
CEV design, if only to maintain the support of the producers of those
components.
“Second, R&D projects will be more attractive if they address a broadly salient
national political issue, so that they plausibly constitute an effective response to a
concern of the citizenry at large.” (Cohen and Noll 1991)
This characteristic is driven by the Congressional requirement that a coalition be
built in order to achieve action. Although each member of Congress serves a
given fixed constituency, a program is much more likely to receive support from
fellow members if it is viewed as a boon to the nation, rather than simply a
“pork-barrel” for particular districts. It is within this context that the national
pride and prestige elements of human spaceflight become the most important – if
a majority in Congress perceives that the national interest is threatened, more
support may be expected. The Apollo program was the archetype of this modality
(Van Dyke 1964). Nevertheless, such threats are generally short-term in nature
and cannot be expected to provide sustainable results. NASA Administrator
Griffin’s drive to accelerate the CEV represents such a concern, ensuring that the
US will not cede superiority in human spaceflight to other nations (Technology
News 2005).
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“Third, an R&D program will be more attractive if it has a short time horizon
and does not entail a radical change in the technological base of an industry.”
(Cohen and Noll 1991)
This characteristic speaks to the need for Congress members to show results to
their constituents within an election cycle (as little as two years for a US
representative). Furthermore, the industrial base requirement suggests that the
costs of showing these results should be relatively small and should displace the
smallest number of people and equipment possible. In the specific context of the
CEV, this characteristic provides a direct justification for acceleration of the
program while simultaneously maintaining the employment of the existing
aerospace workforce. Once again, legacy technologies are useful in implementing
this directive.
“Fourth, the net benefits of a program are likely to play an important role early in
the history of a program, simply because there are only weak political reasons to
undertake a program unless it is economically attractive.” (Cohen and Noll 1991)
The explanation for this characteristic is similar to that of the previous two.
When a program is first proposed, it requires a broad national consensus in order
for it to be approved and then funded. In order for it to avoid cancellation, it
must deliver upon these commitments. Nevertheless, once the program has
become significantly entrenched, individual members of Congress will be willing
to expend political capital to advocate for its continued existence. This is largely
because it is in their interest to see to their constituents’ continued well-being.
There are also valid national reasons to maintain a skilled workforce that can be
mobilized when necessary, but until such a mobilization is required, the benefits
of this maintenance are conferred upon those particular regions of the nation
where the workforce is located, whereas the costs are diffused upon the entire
nation. Programs often take advantage of this characteristic, using what is
euphemistically referred to as the “camel’s nose”: An agency may “wedge” a
program into the budget, initially requesting little and then allowing costs to
overrun as the program matures (Wildavsky 1964).
“Fifth, programs that can be fragmented into many, largely independent
components are usually more attractive politically than programs that can be
implemented only if they are centralized.” (Cohen and Noll 1991)
The logic underlying this characteristic relates to the observation that support in
Congress is roughly proportional to the number of Congress members willing to
advocate for the program (exceptions to this rule involve the support or
opposition of powerful figures such as chairs of relevant committees, and other
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leadership positions). If a significant number of people are employed by a given
program within a given district, the representatives of that district will be willing
to lend their political capital to the cause. A technical system that can be easily
fragmented and spread around the country such that parts of it can be built in
many districts will benefit from this support (Klein 2000). Distributed
management brings similar benefits (Baldwin and Clark 1997). For example, the
Space Shuttle program gained significant support from the Utah delegation in
Congress when Morton Thiokol, a Utah-based company, was selected as the
prime contractor for the Shuttle’s Solid Rocket Motors, even though this required
that special additional infrastructure be created to transport these often highly
volatile components to Florida for launch (Hoff 1997). The Space Shuttle and
International Space Station programs have been highly successful in maintaining
Congressional support through distribution. Thus, this characteristic suggests that
the distribution assigned during these programs not be changed, and that existing
infrastructure be utilized to the greatest extent possible. It is generally considered
politically prudent to locate these facilities (and the resulting jobs) in the districts
of powerful members of Congress. Nevertheless, it is not advisable to spread the
program too much. Given that NASA’s budget is relatively fixed and incremental,
over-spreading of the program will lead to less spending per district, engendering
less support from each Congress-member. In all, the distributive benefits to be
realized would be too small to cross the threshold of political salience (Kingdon
2003). Furthermore, members of Congress will usually not advocate to increase
the number of jobs in their district – rather, they will simply defend the
employment of those already there (Cohen and Noll 1991). In addition,
transportation and communication costs engender technical inefficiency.
Figure 7 displays the distributive breakdown of the Space Shuttle program.
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Figure 7: Locations of Space Shuttle contractors
and suppliers. Imagery obtained using Google
Earth (http://earth.google.com). Data obtained
from (Dumoulin 1988).
A plurality of Space Shuttle contracts are located in southern California, generally
considered to be the seat of the American aerospace industry. There are also
other large constituencies that must be taken into account, including the Kennedy
and Johnson Space Centers (in Cape Canaveral, Florida and Houston, Texas,
respectively), Lockheed Martin’s Michoud Shuttle External Tank Assembly
Facility in Louisiana, and ATK’s Solid Rocket Booster plant in Brigham City,
Utah. These regions represent powerful constituencies as well as a high
concentration of skilled aerospace workers, and are natural considerations for
legacy design. Re-use of the facilities and components mentioned above therefore
has significant political, as well as technical and economic, benefits. It should be
explicitly noted that the political benefits that accrue are only in effect for as long
as the actual legacy systems are still available. For example, a choice to use the
Saturn V rocket within the space exploration architecture would likely be
unsupportable, if only because no Saturn V has been built in over 30 years – the
infrastructure required to do this no longer exists. Similarly, the Apollo TPS
(thermal protection system) material, Avcoat 5026, is no longer in production,
leaving NASA without a replacement human-rated ablative TPS material (The
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005).
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“Sixth…Proponents of unattractive ongoing projects…will often seek logrolls
with advocates of new programs, thereby achieving majority support and
presidential consent for the entire package.” (Cohen and Noll 1991)
This characteristic speaks to the practice of Congressional “logrolling”, wherein
one member will support another’s agenda in return for a future vote of support.
Linking new programs to old programs allows the implied continuation of one
program by folding it into another. In other words, transitions between programs
should be sufficiently smooth that the end of one program is indistinguishable
from the start of the next (Wildavsky 1964). Use of legacy components on the
CEV enables supporters of the Shuttle and ISS programs to claim a linkage to a
popular Moon/Mars exploration endeavor. At the same time, proponents of this
new exploration program can point to the Shuttle and ISS programs as stepping
stones to their goals. This characteristic therefore acts to minimize technical
change from year to year. Agencies take advantage of this characteristic through
the “bundling” of programs: If an agency’s budget is to be cut, agencies may try
to cut the most popular program using a deterrent threat as a political maneuver
(Wildavsky 1964). On the other hand, if cuts are certain, losing the least popular
programs will maintain a coalition (Wildavsky 1964). Thus, the political calculus
of a program manager within an incremental agency depends strongly on how
much support s/he expects the program to receive. It is for this reasons that
agencies maintain strong ties to Congress through liaison offices (Murphy 1972).
One may conclude from the above characteristics that the average incremental
Congress will base its decisions largely upon considerations of cost, schedule,
performance, distributive benefits, and national utility. In particular, we may
distinguish two modes of behavior under which a program might receive support.
The first mode, characterizing the Space Shuttle and International Space Station
programs, is best described as incremental. Under this regime, cost, and to a
lesser extent, schedule, are the main architectural drivers of the program (Maier
and Rechtin 2000). Without a clear national goal to adhere to, Congressional
support for these programs focuses on the distributive benefits that they may
deliver to individual districts (Kingdon 2003). Coalitions are built around
maintaining these entrenched interests, sometimes at the expense of technical
performance metrics (Cohen and Noll 1991). The second mode, characterizing
the Apollo program and other pride and prestige items, is much more
performance-driven (Van Dyke 1964). Although distributive interests do play a
large role in the structuring of the program, the need to achieve high performance
mitigates the resulting inefficiencies somewhat (McDougall 1985). The presence
of a national goal or national concern helps to focus efforts and can serve to draw
resources to the program, mitigating the budgetary wrangling often associated
with incremental programs. Nevertheless, the nature of national crises is that they
must generally be solved quickly. Thus, this latter mode is likely not sustainable
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over a period of time sufficiently long to execute the entire Vision for Space
Exploration or any other sustained directive. Furthermore, national goals are
subject to rapid change and are motivated by such things as economic prosperity
and foreign threats, most of which are rapidly changing and notoriously difficult
to predict. The checks and balances system of the US federal government is
configured to establish oversight by the Congress of large, Presidential
expenditures. Therefore, even in the presence of a long-term goal, one may
expect the eventual modus operandi of federal agency spending to be incremental
and distributive. This pattern is confirmed by NASA history (Jahnige 1968).
Thus, we may think of the budgeting process for NASA as consisting of an
incremental steady-state with occasional transient peaks. As such, we may expect
Congressional valuations of NASA’s budgetary request to be different during
these peaks as compared to the incremental steady-state. Table 1 summarizes the
type of behavior that we might expect from Congress, given the environment in
which a budgetary request is made:
Table 1: Expected Congressional budgeting
behavior under periods of incrementalism and
national salience
Incrementalism National Salience
Slight changes in budgetary allocation
from year-to-year
Infrequent larger changes in budget are
possible
Program is cost-driven – budget-
constraints drive design and outcome.
Program is schedule- and performance-
driven – budget is negotiable to meet
objective.
Coalition-building drives re-use of
legacy components – sometimes at the
cost of technical efficiency
Drive toward technical optimality
allows development of new
components and facilities.
The above analysis demonstrates that policy choices do not stand in a vacuum.
Rather, they may be influenced by many factors, including technical choice. Space
systems, and space system engineering, are complex by nature. That complexity is
exacerbated by uncertainty within the political environment. Although some work
has been performed enumerating the effects of policy choices on the technical
architecture, there is no clear framework for how technology affects policy. This
thesis is aimed at providing such a framework within the context of NASA’s
space exploration plans.
Conclusion
The political science literature provides us a sense for what motivates political
change. Whereas technical choice is based upon tractable theory that can be
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pursued to a rational and often deterministic end, political choice is marked by an
environment of information scarcity wherein many of the options available to a
decision-maker are not clear. A political decision-maker is thus forced to choose
between a limited number of generally sub-optimal options, often without the
time or ability to investigate the full ramifications of these options in detail. As
such, an entity that can exercise control over the information available to policy
makers can exercise some element of control over the outcomes. In particular,
NASA’s technical expertise allows a powerful role in defining options that are to
be presented as policy choices.
It is up to the policy maker to make decisions based upon what information and
options are the most salient to his/her own values. To the policy-maker, agencies,
such as NASA, are tools to be used in implementing a specific policy directive.
Therefore, an agency will receive attention when its work can be used to satisfy a
salient directive, or when its goals are instrumental towards achieving the policy-
maker’s goals. Since goals change, an agency cannot always fulfill a salient
concern. During these periods, they are dominated by role-based activity. The
budgeting process, in particular, is dominated by a particular type of role-based
activity often referred to as “incrementalism”. Furthermore, there is a
considerable body of space policy literature characterizing NASA as incremental.
As such we can expect NASA’s budgeting behavior to be largely driven by the
same forces that drive most incremental agencies. Generally, these act to maintain
the status quo by creating an environment of budgetary scarcity for new projects.
In technical terms, this drives the agency to reduce costs of new programs. Use of
legacy components and technology is one widely-used means of reducing costs
while simultaneously forging a political linkage between new and old programs.
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